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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents do not controvert the statement of 
facts of the appellants so far as the same are stated~ but 
the respondents desire to supplement by further statement 
of facts .. 
The property of the appellants was located partly in 
Davis County and partly in Salt Lake Connty, containing 
a total of 8.63 acres of land. The State Road Commission 
commenced two separate suits~ one in Salt Lake Colll1ty~ 
Civil No~ 105534, in which suit \Vas included 8~01 acres 
and the other action in Davis County, Civil No. 6132, in 
which was included .62 acres which was owned by the 
appellant subject to a right of \Vay in favor of North Salt 
Lake. The State Road Commission fiJcd the action in Salt 
Lake CoWity on Jrme 30~ 19551 and the action in Davis 
County on November 3, 1955. 
The Salt Lake County case, Civil No. 105534~ is exhibit 
H3P" in the instant action and Civi1 !\'"o~ 6132 1 in Davis 
County) is exhibit u2pu_ Herbert B. Maw made an appear-
ance in both cases for the appellants and filed an answer 
in the Salt Lake Cormty case on December 12, 1955, praying 
for judgment on $275t000.00 plus interest. Ivlr .. Ma\v made 
his first apearancc for the appellants in the Salt Lake Coun-
ty case on July 20, 1955J and in the Davis County case on 
November 21~ 1955. 
The agreement for employment of attorneys which ap-
pears as exhibit .c~1D' 1 and is set forth in appendix A of 
appellants brieft was dated January 12, 1956. 
The Salt Lake County Case was first tried before a 
jury who returned a verdict on April 7, 195G, of $150,000.00 
and judgment upon the verdict was entered May 14, 1956~ 
but the cause was appealed to the Supreme Court of the 
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State of Utah and reversed for new trial. The second trial 
of the cause \vas before a jmy who returned a verdict on 
April 9, 1958, of S 175,000~ 00, and upon refusal of the State 
to accept a settlement upon remittitur of S35j000~00, judg-
ment was entered for $175~000.00 plus interest in the fur .. 
ther sum of $28~520.98, from which judgment the State 
appealed. However1 pending appeal the State paid on Jtme 5, 
1958t the sum of $72 1000.00 to the I\'obles, this being the 
highest appraisal placed upon the property by the State. 
In an opinion filed J\.tarch 2, 1959, the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah held that the evidence supported a judg· 
ment of $140,000.00 with interest and costs. On March 17, 
1959~ judgment \\~"as entered in favor of the I\"!obles and 
against the State of "Ctah for $93t093.37 as the balance due 
in the Salt Lake County case. 
The Davis County case "~as set Ued by stipulation and 
judhrment was entered on }1atch 5j 1957~ in the sum of 
$1:P975.00 in full settlement lnc1uding all interest, costs and 
c1aims of every natu:re. (E.xhibit ~'2P") 
By \vay of further statement of facts, the respondents 
quote fi~om the findings of fact of the Trial Court: (R 70) 
'~That the amount recovered in Civil No. 6132 
in Davis County~ Utah 'vas .$1)975.00, which sum was 
paid to the defendants. The amount recovered in Civ-
il No. 105534 in Salt Lake County was $169~593.37. 
The total amormt recovered from the State of Utah 
from said condemnation proceedings was the sum of 
$171~578.37+ 
That according to the terms of said agreement 
between the plaintiffs and defendants~ the fee due 
the plaintiffs is computed as follows: 
(a) 15~-c of amounts over $80,000.. 
to $90~000~ = $1~590~00 
(b) 25% of amotu1ts over $90~000. 
to $11o~ooo. = $5 Jooo.oo 
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(c) 30{/c ~f amounts over $110,000. 
. to $120:.00Ct = . $3)000.00 
(d) 507o of amourit over $120,000. 
to 5171,578~37 or $50,578.37_ == 825]789.18 
Total fee due plaintiff $35,289.18 
That the defendants have paid to the plaintiffs 
the sum of $24,038.60, leaving a balance due to the 
plaintiffs under the terms of said agreement the smn 
of $11 ~250.58.'' 
Counsel for the appellants stated to the "Trial Court 
that there was no dispute about the work done by the re-. 
spondents ( R 24) ~ and that there was no question that the 
attorneys went to the Supreme Court nvice and brought 
.excellent results ( R 26) ~ 
POINT I 
THE CONTRACT FOR EMPLO'Yl\1ENT OF A TTOR-
NEYS WAS NOT AlVIBIGUOUS AND AS CONSTRUED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT, CORRECTLY REFLECTS THE 
INTENTION OF TilE PARTIES. 
Respondents acknowledge that if the contract between 
an attorney and client is ambiguous wherein one of the-
reasonable interpretations of the contract would result in 
an injustice to the c1ient_. then meaning should be given to 
the contract whlch results in doing justice to the cl icnt. 
However~ in the instant case~ the contract was not ambig-
uous and the interpretation of the contract a." given by the 
trial court does not work an injustice upon the client, since 
the client acknowledged that the attorneyst services \Vere 
substantial and satisfactory and made no claim that the 
resulting fee to the attorneys was in any way excessive. 
The case of Pinto v. Seely, 22 Cal. App. 318~ 135 P. 43, 
(App. Br. 8) ~ after stating that any ambiguity should be 
construed most favorably to the interests of the client also 
added the following: 
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HWe do not understand~ however, that the rule 
in this be half is so inflexible that it may be invoked 
to perpetra tc a palpable injustice) or that it calls for 
a construction of such contract beyond the express 
covenants of the parties~' t 
The case of Waugh et al v. Q4 & C. Co4 et alt CCA 7th 
(1926) 16 F. 2d 363 cited by (Appr Brr 8) ~ in fact found 
the agreement fair and unambiguous~ 
Before considering in detail the case law t we refer to 
Webster's New International DictionaryJ Second Edition, 
1938, the meaning given to the words j:~Recover/~ and ~~Re­
covery~J: 
'~~=Recover'' : 
14~ LA \V. To gain as compensation: to ob-
tain in return for injury or debt; as, to recover dam-
ages in trespass; to recover debt and costs in a suit 
at la\v; to obtain title to or possession of something 
by final decree or judgment in a court of la\v; as to 
recover lands in ejectment or real action; to gain by 
legal process; a.';~ to recover judgment against a 
defendant. 
'"Recover~/~ : 
7. LAW. The obtaining in a suit at law of a 
right to sometl1ing by a verilict, decree or judgment 
of court, esp. by the final one deciding the issues 
involved; specif. a common recovery. A final recov .. 
ery is one obtained by a verdict or final decree or 
judgment. Its total is the sum awarded and docs not 
include interest after the verdict or decision. 
A layman referring to Webster's Dictionary could easily 
determine that all interest up to the time of final verdict, 
judgment or decision is included in the \Vords '~ recovert ~ or 
"'recovery'~ t and more certain1y would be included in the 
words ''amounts recovered"" and •"any amolUlts recoveredu~ 
which being in the plural must embrace interest as well as 
principal. 
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POINT II 
INTEREST AWARDED IN A CONDEJ1N/JtTION 
SUIT IS FOUNDED UPON THE SAME CASES AND 
REASONING AS INTEREST UPON CONTRACT OBLI-
GATIONS IN GEXERAL. 
Respondents do not dispute the contention of the ap-
pellants in Point II ( App, Br + 9) that interest a,,_, a rdcd jn 
a condemnation suit is a\varded as a matt.er of right and 
not as a matter of judicial discretion, \Vhere allowable. 
This means, however, that interest \vi11 be a'varded, allowed, 
and paid:t only at such time as the claim for the principal 
is fully established, and 'v hen it is so establish cd the in tc rest 
becomes as much a part of the recovery as the principal 
and is in eluded in the final judgmen tr 
The case of Fen v .. Union Pacific Railroad Co.:t 32 L"":tah 
101J 88 P. 1003:t cited by the {App. Br. 9) \Vas a suit to 
recover damages for the injury to livestock which were 
injured while in transit. The trial court entered judgment 
for the damages plus interest on the damages from the date 
of injury~ \l'hich judgment was affirmed on appeal, the 
court holding in the last paragraph of its opinion as foil ows: 
HThe true test to be applied as to whether inter-
est should be allowed before judgment in a given 
case or not is~ thereforcj not \vhether the damages 
are unliquidated or otherwise, but \vhethcr the in-
jury and consequent damages arc complete and must 
be ascertained as of a particular time and in accor-
dance with fixed rules of evidence and kno,vn stan-
dards of value, 'vhich the court or jury must follo\v 
in fixmg the amountt rather than be guided by their 
best judgment in assessing the amormt to be allo\ved 
for past as well as for future injury~ or for elements 
that cannot be measured by any fixed standards of 
value. The same rule under the same conditions 
would of necessity apply to actions for breach of 
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contract. This is illustrated by some of the Califor-
nia cases, as well as by the Nevada case cited by 
cOWlsel for appellant. As the case at bar falls clearly 
within the rule where the amount is computed as 
of a fixed time, and in accordance with fixed rules 
of evidence as to value~ the court did not err in 
computing~ on the amormt of damages found, inter .. 
est at the legal ra ie ~ 
The judgment therefore is affirmed, with costs.'~ 
In the case of Oregon SJwrtline Railroad Co. v. Jones, 
29 Utah 147, 80 Pac. 732, where no occupancy or possession 
had been taken of the land until after judgment, the land-
O\\'ner contended they were entitled to interest from the 
date of the summons. The court held that the lando\Vller 
was not entitled to interest from the date of the summons, 
but if at all, only from the date of occupancy~ We quote 
from the last paragraph of the opinion of the court: 
'~=To allow appeJ Ian ts' claim of interest to pre-
vail, we arc obliged to read something into the sta .. 
tute not fonnd there~ Nor does it come within uny 
of the rules of the cases where interest has been aJ-
lowed. Here there has been no entry or occupation 
of the property~ :\or was there any time prior to the 
verdict of the jury when the amormt of plaintiff~s 
liability had been determined. Xor was there any 
time \Vhen it could have taken possession and given a 
writ of assistance therefor until final judgment and 
order of condemnation. And the authorities seem 
to be that one or more of these things must be shown 
to entitle the landowner to interest. 'J 
In the case of Kimba.n v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 253~ 
90 Pac. 395. 'vhere the landov.rner claimed interest from 
the city for damages caused by change of grade of a street 
by the city. the court in follo\ving the case of Fell v ~ Union 
Pacific Railroad allowed interest on damages found as of 
the date of completion of the change of gTade, stating that 
this allowance of interest on a claim for unliquidated da· 
10 
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mages is based on the contract principles annormced in Fell 
v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. 
The case of the Salt Lake and Utah Railroad Co~ ~ .. 
Schramm et aJ .. ~ 56 Utah 53~ 189 Pac. 90, the court held 
that the landowner was entitled to interest from the date 
of the order of occupancy and not from the date of the 
commencement of the action, following the case of Oregon 
Shoctline Railroad Co. v+ Jones~ and the Supreme Court 
ordered the judgment modified to a11ow interest on the 
verdict from the date of occupancy rather than the date 
of commencement of the action. 
The foregoing review of the Utah decisions \vould seem 
to indicate that interest allowed in condemnation suits is 
based upon contract principles and that such interest as 
accrues from the date of occupancy or injury is included 
in the judgment .. 
POINT III 
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES AS SHOWN BY 
THE CONTRACT WAS THAT THE WORDS ~~AlVIOUNTS 
RECOVEREDt~ AND ~~ANY AMOUNT RECOVERED!' 
IN EFFECT MEAN AMOUNTS COLLECTED~ WHETH-
ER INTEREST OR PRINCIPAL. 
The appellants seek to exclude all interest on the first 
$80 ~000.00 of the principal, and apparently base their con-
tention upon the unfonnded asswnption that the State had 
set aside $80,000.00 as an award to the defendants prior to 
condemnation. 
As appears from exhibit ''3P!t, Civil No. 105534:r the 
SaJt Lake Cormty case~ condemnation proceedings were fil-
ed June 30~ 1955; \vhereas the agreement \"Vith the attorneys 
was dated January 12~ 1956. If, in fact:t the appellants had 
11 
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been offered $80,000~00 before June 30J 1955, and if the ap-
pellants had really intended to exclude interest from the a-
mounts recovered they should have commenced the division 
of the fees at S82 ,400 .. 00 to include interest which had ac-
crued from Jrme 30, 1955, to January 12, 1956jthe date of the 
agreement. Furthermore, the appellants elected to gamb]e 
\Vhen they refused to accept the $80~000~00 from the State 
of Utah by way of settlement. As shown by the record in 
Civil No. 105534, the State appraisers had appraised the 
property of the appellants at $57~000.00 and 872~000.00 re-
spectively. Thus the appellants had n"O assurance that they 
""~ouJd receive even $80~000+00 principal and interest~ Also, 
as in all litigationf a Jump sum settlement by \Vay of compro-
mise ''rithout trial was probable, jn \vhich event the settle ... 
mcnt figure would have included interest and principal 
without distinction as to whether interest or principal were 
being compromised. In fact the Davis County case was 
scttl cd on ~VIa rch 5~ 1957, for $1,975.00 including interest 
and cosl';, (exhibit 2P) . 
\V c no'v review the cases cited by the appellants deal-
ing \vith contingent fee contracts based upon recovery or 
similar terms. Sanders v. RiddichJ 127 Ten. 700, 156 S. W. 
464, was a case \Vhere the client employed the attorneys in 
a damage suit \Vherein no interest \Vas contemplated to be 
included in the judgment, under 001 agreement as follo\-'"l"~s: 
~~1, W. B. Sanders, hereby employ IVIarion G. 
Evans and T. K. Riddich as my attorneys to repre-
sent me in my suit against Memphis Street Rai1way, 
and I hereby agree that tl1ey may retain as their fee 
one-third of the recovery in case the same if"i tmder 
$12,000.00 and one-fourth in case the same is 
$12/100.00 or over.n 
The trial court construed the agreement in favor of the 
attorneys saying that the interest which accrued after 
12 
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judgment would not be considered part of the recovery to 
defeat the attorneys one-third fee and require the attorney 
to take one .. fourth .. It is to be noted here that at the time 
the agreement was made the attorneys and client did not 
anticipate any interest to be included in the recovery;P this 
being a personal injmy matter. 
The case of Covert v. Randles (App. Br. 13) \vas also 
decided in favor of the attorneys in a case where the client 
employed the attorneys to recover approximately $41~000 .. 00 
worth of bonds \Vhich were stolen from her and she 
agreed to pay 8~i of the amount recovered up to the 
sum of $20,000.00) and 59~ of the balance recovered. About 
$24~500 .00 worth of bonds \V hich included accrued interest, 
\Vere impormdcd in the United States District Court at 
Los Angeles and about S7,000.00 in the United States Dis-
trict Court for Arizona~ leaving about $10:r000. 00 in the 
hands of thieves or persons who had purchased the same 
from the thieves~ The attorneys, by way of compromise 
before judgmentt obtained the bonds from the district court 
and approximately S4j000.00 of the other bonds. The client 
contended they tverc not entitled to any fee because the 
word ~~recovered~j required judgment and execution~ The 
court quoted from 53 Corpus Juris 655~ Section Onet as 
follO\VS: 
'•Recover. (sec. 1) A~ In Broad General Sense. 
To co11ect; to come in to possession of; to get~ obtain, 
procure, recei vc ~ ~ md the like; * * * 
H (Sec~ 2) B. In Narro\ver Legal Sense the term 
has a well defined meaning; and has been variously 
defined as to be successful in a suit; to collect or 
obtain the amount, possibly by a suit at Jaw; to 
have judgment; to obtain a favorable or final judg-
ment; to obtain by course of la 'v; to obtain by judi-
cial action or proceeding~ or in any legal manner; 
13 
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to obtain by means of an action~ in contrast to vol-
untary payment; to obtain title to by final decree or 
judgment in a court of law; to succeed in an actiont 
or in a law suit; and in this 1egal sense., it has been 
held not to include neccessarily, or even ordinarilyJ 
the actual payment of the money sued for.'' 
The Arizona court did not seek to give the word '~recover~' 
the narrow meaning suggested by the text quoted, and 
stated that the intent of the parties governs~ and tl it ap .. 
pears from the contract that the parties intended the word 
''recover~' as used therein should mean the same as to col-
lect, (to come into possession oft to get~ etc .. ' t we should so 
construe it.. The court then affirmed the judgment which 
granted the attorneys their percentage upon all of the bonds 
that they recovered~ whether by suit or otherwise. Under 
comment nine, the court stated that the compensation of 
the attorney should be based on the cash value of the bonds, 
and not the par value~ and as such the cash value of the 
bonds necessarily included the accrued interest. 
The case of Bassford v+ Johnson, 172 N.Y. 488t 65 N.E~ 
260 (App. Br. 14) where the lando~er agreed to pay the 
attorney '~10~'o of whatever award may be obtained for my 
land~', the appellate court awarded the attorney 109C. of all 
interest as well as the principal amount of the award. The 
Bassford case conclusively holds that interest do\Vll to 
date of payment is included in the award for the ptrrpOSes 
of the attorneys fee. For the appellants to contend that the 
instant case should be considered as if an award of 
$140~000~00 had been made on July 30~ 1955, is to substitute 
in the contract for the words "~amounts recovered'' the word 
''verdict.~' If the contract had been for a prorated share of 
the verdict then the reasoning of the appellants would apply. 
It will be seen in this case that the jury verdict was 
$175,000.00., to which interest was to be added; however~ 
14 
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this was in no sense the amotmt recovered, since until the 
Supreme Court made its decision, and the State of Utah 
rnade payment, the amount was not recovered. 
In the case of Smith v. Whitman, 159 Md. 478, 150 A. 
856 (App. Br. 15) the court found the agreement was for 
•~one ... third of the amormt they might recover for the defen-
dants, less the sum of $3~000.00 which had been a\varded 
to the defendants by the Aberdeen Proving Ground Land 
Commission . . . '' A careful reading of this case shows the 
facts to be that the attorneys had told the clients at the 
outset~ that no interest was recoverable on their claim 
against the government, so that the parties contracted 
without anticipating any interest to be a part of the recov-
ery. The total final award was $63,500~00 principalJ and 
$42, 572~29 interest, making a total of $106J072. 29. The trial 
court granted a prayer for directed verdict of the attorneys 
wherein it deducted $3,000.00 p1us interest on said $3~000.00 
from the total award before giving the attorneys their 
one-third~ However, this case \vas reversed because the 
trial court did not permit the jury to find the facts stated in 
the attorneys' prayer~ Thus the appellate court never did 
pass upon the question of whether the $3~000~ 00 p1us inter-
est was to be excluded, and this $3,000.00 pius interest was 
volunteered by the attorneys to be excluded by their O\Vll 
prayer. The appellate court, at the close of comment three, 
stated: 
''The suit was upon a con tract whereby the p1 aintiffs 
were to be paid a contingent fee of one-thlrd of the amormt 
recovered~ which amount, in our opinion~ included not only 
the sum awarded to the rrustees for the land taken and 
the damage to the other lands caused by such taking, but 
also the amount received as interest thereon~ and the right 
of the plaintiffs to recover one-third of the entire amolUltJ 
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principal and interest, a warded to the trustees was in no 
\Vay af fcctcd by the fact that the plaintiffs at one time 
told the defendants that in their opinion no interest could be 
collected upon their claim~~' 
l-Ienee, the courts never did pass upon the question as to 
whether or not the interest on the first S3t000 ~00 ""ra~ to be 
included or excluded from the contract under an agreement 
as \~.rordcd above, and in fact the portion of the opinion 
quoted above sho\VS tl1at the appellate court felt the attor-
neys cnti tied to one-third of the entire amonnt of principal 
and interest. 
It is q ucstionable that appellants are serious in their 
contention that to allow attorneys interest on this $80,000.00 
is unconcionable, \loh P.U the facts are that the attorneys put 
in daub le the 'vork contemplated, with t\vo trials and t\vice 
before the Supreme CoW"t. In fact, the only \vay such extra 
\VOrk may be even partly compensated is by allowing inter-
est on this part of amount rccoveredj which the contract~ 
under any reasonable meaning, surely included. Also from 
the total amount recovered in the sum of 8171 j578~37, the 
attorneys claimed only .$35,289 .. 18, leaving the clients 
$136j289 .. 19. 
POINT IV 
I;{ EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS)' BOTH 
PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST ARE AWARDED AS A 
]dA.TfER OF LEGAL RIGHT, HOVVEVER~ THE AMOUNT 
OF EACH AND THE RECOVERY THEREOF IS ONLY 
ACCOMPLISHED WITH EFFORT~ 
The appellants in point IV of their brief regard inter-
est as a matter of legal \vindfall which is obtained without 
effort once the value of the land at the time of the taking 
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is determined. Certainly interest cou1d not be recovered 
without litigating the matter of principal, and although the 
law is now established that the O\vner is entitled to interest 
in certain cases as a matter of legal right, nevertheless~ it 
requires the efforts of the attorneys to assert such legal 
right. The matter of interest in eminent domain proceedings 
has been the subject of 1i tigation in this state which has 
established the rules pertaining to the a ward of interest in 
absence of an express statute awarding interest in eminent 
domain proceedings. Oregon Shortline Railroad Co. v Jones 
(supra ------------) stated the rule that interest \vas not allo\ved 
from the date of summons~ but would be alio\ved only from 
the date of occupancy. In Kimball v. Salt Lake City (supra 
. ·-·~· -~ ~ ___ ) this court held that the 1andowne r was en ti t1 ed to 
interest from the date the street improvements \Vere com .. 
plcted in changing the grade of the street, as a matter of 
legal right; but this legal right was not established \\tithout 
litigation. In the case of State v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 2G5 
P. 2d 630 (1953) the court held that it was not violative 
of the constitutional provision that '~private property shaH 
not be taken or damaged fot public use without just com-
pensation~' to disallow interest in condenmati on proceedings 
after service of summons but before occupancy. There is 
.:m inference here that if interest is allo\ve d from the date 
of occupancy, the denial thereof \\"'ould be a taking of the 
property without just compensation as such interest is con-
sidered part of compensation for the 1 and taken4 
Considering now some of the cases cited in point IV 
of the appellants brief, the case of People v. Kelly (App. Br. 
19) was a case in which the landowners had already ob-
tabted a judgment against the city for land condemned by 
the city~ and the interest in the controversy arose upon and 
after the judgment. The judgment itself was paidj but in-
terest on the judgment accruing after the date of the judg-
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ment was not pai~. The legislature authorized the city to 
issue bonds to pay matured .lfonds and judgment debts. Th.e 
appellate .co~ held that the interest on the_ judgment \vas 
not authorized by the legislature to be paid from the new 
bonds. Under comments three and four the court said: 
'~It is to be observed that two classes of interest 
are contemplated by the statute, i. er, that which 
accrues prior to the judgment} and interest which 
accrues after the judgment is entered~ Interest a.e· 
cruing before judgment is exprcssJy made a part of 
the judgment, but no such provision is made as 
to interest accruing on a judgment after it is enter-
ed.'' 
Thus the holding in the case of People v. KelJy when con-
sidering the portion quoted by the appellant and the por-
tin quoted by the respondents indicates that the court con-
sidered interest accruing before judgment as being part of 
the value of the land taken. 
The case of HollingstVorth v~ Lewis (App. Br~ 19} in 
addition to the portion quoted by the a ppe1lants~ said: 
~'In very short, we are asked to determine the 
length and breadth of the meanillg of the word 
'refunds' as used in the contract executed by the 
parties~'' 
Then quoting \Vebster's Dictionary they fonnd the word 
HrcfliDdn means to repay. The court then further stated: 
''As the defendants never paid any interest to 
the railroad company~ in no proper sense can it be 
said that any railroad company ~ ~ . repaid (that is 
refunded) any interest money. By the terms of the 
con tract executed by the parties, the plaintiff \vas 
never authorized to receive 50~--~ of all moneys col-
Iected.'t 
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By implication, the court held that if the contract had been 
for 50 ~/C. of al 1 moneys collected J it \Vo uld have included 
interest. 
In the case of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v .. 
Coachman (APP~ Br. 21) p the court was construing a statute 
relating to claims against common carriers for damage or 
overcharge in connection \vith freight carried. The statuto 
required the carrier to pay claims \vithin 60 days from 
presentation and upon failure to do so 
~~shall be Hable to the claimant for the amount of 
his claim and fifty per cent per annum interest on 
the principal sum of said claim from date of filing 
. . . and \Vhen the said claimant shall bring suit 
and recover judgment for his claim against said 
common carrier, he ~hall be allowed the said fifty 
per cent per annum in addition to the principal sum 
of said claim, and the same shall be a llo\ved in the 
verdict giving him judgment; . ~ . in the event that 
the claimant shall prevail in an action to recover 
on his cia im, [the carrier shall J be liable for a reas-
onable attorney:t s fee . . . \vhich shall be fixed by 
the court, not to exceed fifteen dollars if the amotmt 
recovered docs not exceed one hundred doUars:t and 
not to exceed fifteen per cent on any amount recov-
ered greater than the swn of one hundred dollars..n 
The court said the intent of the statute was not to- allow 
attorney:t s fees upon the fifty per cent interest, saying: 
''Especially is this clear in that part of the stat-
ute providing that attorney's fee shaU be fixed by 
the court, not to exceed fifteen dollars if the amolUlt 
recovered does not exceed one hundred dollars.'' 
The court construed this particular statutory use of '~amount 
recoveredtJ to exclude interest. 
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W c now cite to the court other cases which construe 
the term.s ~-trecover'' or ~"recovery~'. 
Manzo v. Dullea~ 96 F. 2d 135, Second Circuit Court 
( 1938), 116 A.L.R. 1241. An attorney agreed \vith the 
client to sue to recover on an insurance policy upon a re-
tainer agreement of 25?·i of any amount recovered by trial~ 
or 20?n of any amount realized by settlement. Judgment 
was recovered consisting of S13:t500.00 damages pius 8919.42 
interest plus $164.87 costs~ From this amonnt a mortgagee 
was first paid, leaving a check of $9,423.06. The attorney 
claimed a fee based upon the full recovery of S15,429.33, 
but the client contended he should only get a fee based up-
on the $9,423r06, which was the net amount of the check~ 
The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the attorney was 
entitled to one. f otu"th of the 815~ 429.33 :t including the costs. 
Vaughan v~ Humphreys, Ark~ (1922)J 239 S.W. 730t 
22 A.L.R. 1201. In this case the attorney contracted to bring 
suit against a life insurance company and to receive as 
compensation 40?o of the recovery. Judgment was obtained 
against the insurance company for $5,000 .. 00, plus accrued 
interest, and attorneys fees as allowed by the statute were 
fixed by the court at $500.00. The attorney claimed that he 
was entitled to the entire $500.00 attorneyts fee, plus 40~·'a 
of the rest of the recovery. Trial judge a\varded the attorney 
40% of all of the recovery, which included $5000.00 plus 
the accrued interest, plus $500.00 attorney~s fees. The Su-
preme Court in affirming the trial court saidt Wlder com-
ment two: 
( 2) The legal meaning of the word urecovery!' is 
the obtaining of a thing by the judgment of the 
court as a result of an action brought for the pur-
pose~ The contract under consideration provides that 
the attorney shall have 40 ~(: of the recovery~ This 
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means 40% of the amount recovered by the policy 
holder which, as we have seen~ includes the amount 
of the attorney's fee a1lowed by the statute to the 
policy holder~ under the statute this is as much a 
part of the recovery of the policy holder as is the 
face of the policy and the penalty provided by the 
statute.n 
POINT V 
DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO INTER-
EST ON ANY SUM ADVANCED PLAINTIFFS~ AND 
IF OTHERWISE ENTITLED TO INTEREST, THEY 
WAIVED THE SAME AT THE TIME OF TRIAL. 
On June 5~ 1958~ the State Road Conunission paid to 
the defendants the sum of $72,000.00, pending appeal of the 
cause to this court following the second trial, to apply to-
wards any final recovery in the cause. (R23) From this 
$72,000.00~ the defendants paid the attorneys $3,500.00 
and retained the balance. 
It is conceded that if the recovery had not exceeded 
872,000~00 the attorneys would be required to repay the 
$3,500.00 pius interest thereon; h o\vever ~ the recovery hav-
ing been ~171,568437j the advance payment by the State 
should have been considered as an advance payment on 
the final recovery in the cause, and as such, the attorneys 
\VOUld have been entitled to their proportionate share of 
the S72,000.00 when received. The appellants (App. Br~ 22) 
concede that the $3,000.00 paid to the attorneys was ad-
vance attorneys' fees. 
At the close of arguments before the trial court the 
discussion concerned whether or not the attorneys were 
entitled to interest on the balance claimed for attorneys~ 
fees since the defendants had deposited $12t000~00 \Vith the 
clerk as a bond to guarantee payment of the services. The 
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-court inquired whether counsel wanted t}:le court to·consider 
interestt and· the .following discussion· is taken from the 
additional transeript of ·preceedings made by B+ M. Good-
pasture, the court :reporter.: 
THE COL"RT~ Well, I want to know ·something 
about what you want me to do~ to decide on that 
phase~ because ~~e will just come back to another 
feature here that will have to be heard. 
I\ffi. FADEL: Your HonorJ since the time is 
so short ·r \vould say ·that we could make thls deter-
mination~ not eonsidering any interest on the attor-
neys~ · fe~s. 
MR+ COTRO-MANES: \\re waive interestt your 
Honor, on ours. 
TilE COURT: One way·or the other? 
MR. COTRO-MANES: That's right. 
THE COURT: Just these figures that you have 
submitted here. I will have to look at some of your 
cases. 
At the hearing on the objections of the defendants to 
the findings of fact, the trial court stated to counsel that 
the court \Vas of the opinion that the court was relieved of 
considering the question of interest claimed by either par-
ties on the balance due for attorneys' fee or interest on ad-
vanced attorneys~ fees. Even if the trial court were mistak-
en, and the defendants were in fact, entitled to interest. 
the total amotmt as claimed by them on page 23 of their 
brief is .$161.00, which would scarcely require or justify 
a new trial. Furthermore~ the defendants had the use of 
$2,500.00 collected from the house they retained on. the 
premises from July~ 1955; and the use of $1~975.00 paid on 
.the Davis County case, March 5~ 1957~ and $68~500400 from 
-June 5~ 1958t so that the attorneys did not participate in 
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any interest 1n "''hich these sums would have earned as in .. 
terest from the dates received by the defendants to the 
date of payment of the attorneys' fees. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's Find-
ings of Fact~ Conclusions of La\v1 and Judgment are fully 
supported by the evidence and the la\v in the case. 
The cases cited by the appellants:t when analyzed, sup-
port the judgment for the respondents. The instant case is 
stronger than most cases previou:.-:;ly cited, for the reason 
that in the instant case the parties at the outset contracted 
kno\\ring that interest would be included in the amounts 
recovered~ and the u~e of the plural ~'amounts recovered~~~ 
aod ~'any amount recoveredt~ clearly applied to amounts 
paid by the State Road Commission in settlement of the 
final judgmen t4 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed~ 
Respectfully submitted, 
HERBERT B. MAW 
WENDELL B. HAMMOND 
GEORGE K. FADEL 
Attorneys for pla·intif ts and respon.den ts. 
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